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# A C C O U N T

OFF THE  
MOONOLI  
EXPEDITION  
TO

CARTHAGENA, &c.

[Price One Shilling.]

[3] [12 Oct 1811]



See the Plan of the City and Harbour of  
*Carthagena*, published in the LONDON  
MAGAZINE for April 1740; which will  
serve to give the Readers of this Pamphlet a  
clearer Idea of it's Contents.

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A C C O U N T  
O F T H E  
E X P E D I T I O N

T O

C A R T H A G E N A,

W I T H  
EXPLANATORY NOTES  
A N D

O B S E R V A T I O N S.

The THIRD EDITION.

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*Ubi per secordiam vires, tempus, ingenium defuerint,  
naturæ infirmitas accusant: suam quique cibam ac ferri  
ad negotia transferunt.*  
SALLUST.

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AN  
ACCOUNT  
OF THE  
EXPEDITION  
TO  
*CARTHAGENA, &c.*

**I**T having been resolved in a general Council of War, held at *Spaniſh Town*, to prevent, if possible, the *French* Fleet joining the Enemy before any Expedition should be undertaken by Land: the *Wolf* Sloop, Captain *Dandridge*, was dispatched up to *Port Louis*, to observe if the Fleet was in that Port: And on the 2d of *January*, which was the soonest the Fleet could be got ready for the Sea, Sir *Chaloner Ogle* and his Division sailed out of *Port*

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*Port Royal Harbour*; and two Days after Mr. *Leflock* and his Division; and on the *Monday* following the Admiral with the rest of the Squadron (leaving behind him the *Falmouth* and *Litchfield* to bring up the Transports;) but the Land Breeze failing, and a great Swell rolling down, obliged them to anchor at the *Keys* (where the *Augusta* drove ashore, and beat off her Rudder, and great part of her Keel.) On the 28th the Admiral weighed Anchor, and plied up to Windward, and the 31st joined Sir *Chaloner Ogle* and Mr. *Leflock* with their Divisions off *Port Morant*, and the Day following was joined by the *Falmouth*, *Litchfield*, and Transports. February the 7th the Fleet made Cape *Tiberon* on the Island *Hispaniola*, and off there was joined by the *Cumberland*, Captain *Stewart*, from *Lisbon*, (who had been separated from the Fleet

### *Expedition to Cartagena. 3*

Fleet in the Storm the 1st of November) and the next Day the *Wolf* Sloop came into the Fleet [A] and brought with her a *French* Sloop. The 13th the Fleet anchored at the Isle of *Vache*, about two Leagues to the Westward of *Port Louis*,

[A] When Captain *Danbridge*, of the *Wolf*, came into the Fleet, he acquainted the Admiral, that the Marquis *D'Antin* and twelve Ships of War were then in *Port Louis*, which was the Reason the Admiral pursued his Course up to the Isle of *Vache*, where when the Fleet arrived, a *French* Officer coming on board the *Weymouth*, told, the Marquis *D'Antin* was gone Home: Upon the Admiral's being informed of this, he sent Captain *Knowles* up in the *Spence* Sloop to reconnoitre, who returned with Answer, that there was but one Ship of War in *Port Louis*, and that the rest were all light Merchant Ships; however the Admiral chose to be more certain, and having an Opportunity of sending an Answer to the *French* Officer's Message, the next Day sent Captain *Knowles* and Captain *Boscawen* ashore to the Governor, who being politely received, and satisfied with their Remarks, returned in the Evening to the Admiral, and confirmed the foregoing Observation, who, without loss of Time, carried the Fleet where they could best and speediest be watered.

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where they stayed but four Days, having gained Intelligence the *French* Fleet was divided, and sailed (the Marquis *D'Antin* and twelve Sail being gone for *Old France*, and Mr. *Rochefeuille* and six Sail for *Petit Guavas*) upon which the Fleet went and anchored in *Tiberoon*, *Donna Maria*, and *Iriih* Bays, to Wood and Water; and on the 25th sailed from thence, when the *Weymouth*, *Experiment*, and *Spence Sloop*, were dispatched a head over to *Carthageno*, to sound *Punta Canoa Bay*, for the safer anchoring the Fleet, which arrived there the 5th of *March* in the Evening; and three Days after the same Ships, together with the *Dunkirk*, were ordered by the Admiral down off *Bocca Chica*, to sound and see if the Fleet might safely anchor there, and how near Ships might come to batter the Forts of *Sr. Philip* and *St. Jago*; and so soon

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 5

soon as the Admiral had received the Reports from the Commanders of these Ships, a Council of War was held, wherein it was resolved to send three eighty Gun Ships, the *Norfolk*, Captain *Graves*, the *Shrewsbury*, Captain *Townsend*, and the *Russell*, Captain *Norris*, to batter the Forts abovementioned; the *Princess Amelia*, Captain *Hemmington*; to fire against the Fuscine Battery, and the *Litchfield*, Captain *Cleveland*, against the little Battery of *Chamba*; (but these two last the Enemy had abandoned) and accordingly the 9th in the Morning they weighed Anchor from *Punta Canoa* Bay, together with Sir *Chaloner Ogle*, and the rest of his Division, (he being to command the Attack) and about two Hours afterwards, the Admiral and the rest of the Fleet got under sail: At Noon the *Norfolk*, *Russell*, and *Shrewsbury* began to

to cannonade the Forts, and in about three Hours time drove the Enemy from their Guns, and obliged them to abandon their Forts [B]: Immediately on this Sir *Chaloner Ogle* made the Signal for landing the Troops, which was repeated by the Admiral, who was just come to an Anchor, (a little to the Eastward) and about five o'clock in the Evening, a Body of Troops were landed without Opposition; but the General not thinking the Body sufficient,

[B] This Success was obtained by the Loss only of six Men aboard the *Norfolk* and *Russell*, but the *Shrewsbury's* Cable being shot (before her other Anchor could be veered aground) she met with worse Luck: She drove so far as to open the whole Fire of the Castle of *Boccachica*, four of the Enemy's Ships of sixty and seventy Guns, that were moored athwart the Harbour's Mouth, the Battery of St. *Joseph*, and two Faschine Batteries, that were on the *Barradero* Side; all this Fire she lay singly exposed to till dark, when she took the Benefit of the Land-Wind, and ran off, being greatly shattered in her Hull, Masts, and Rigging, and a great many Men killed and wounded.

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## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 7

(he landing with them) embarked again in the Boats, and sent for more [C]. About eight o'Clock they landed again, and went and took Possession of the Forts of St. Philip and St. Jago, and about nine the Bomb-ketches were carried in Shore, and began to play on the Castle of Bocachica. The three next Days were spent in landing the remainder of the Forces, the Baggage, &c. [D] and by the 16th all

[C] It was a Body of eight hundred Grenadiers that first landed, who, during the Time that more Troops were sent for (which was upwards of two Hours before they came) were kept in the Boats, within twenty Yards of the Shore, and so closely crowded, scarce one Man could have used his Arms, that had they had any Enemy to have dealt with, but dastardly Spaniards, they must and would have been cut all to pieces.

[D] During the first three Days the Troops were ashore, they were employed in no one Thing, no not so much as to clear the Ground for their Encampment, but kept under Arms Night and Day (where, by the Heat of the Sun,

all the Cannon, Mortars, and Ordnance Stores were landed [E]. But the principal Engineer not arriving till the 15th, no Spot was pitched

Sun, on a white burning Sand, they were scorched to Death, and by the Inclemency of the Dews in the Night, they got Colds, so that many of them fell sick) whereas had they been instantly employed to have encamped and opened Ground in the Woods for that Purpose, they would have been shaded by the Trees, freed from the burning Heat of the Sand, and many of them preserved from the Enemy's Shot, that missed our Battery.

[E] In the first Place it must be observed, that there never was Application made what particular Ordnance, Stores, &c. to land, or any Scheme formed what Sort of Cannon might be necessary, or what Quantity of Stores wanting, but the whole was landed, and a considerable Part lost by being washed off the Beach by the Sea, and several Carriages broke to pieces by the Enemy's Shot, and the rest left in Heaps in the utmost Confusion; notwithstanding there were near five hundred Seamen appointed for this Purpose; but those Officers, whose Business it was to have formed an Artillery Park (though God knows they called this so) and disposed of the Stores in a regular Manner and Order, were —

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*Expedition to Cartagena.* 9  
upon for raising a Battery [F] against  
the Enemy, so that the clearing a  
few Bushes away down by the Wa-  
ter Side, for to pitch their Tents,  
was all the material Work the Army  
did

[F] Such was the Knowledge of the Sub-  
Engineers, that not one of them knew where  
to chuse out a Spot of Ground for raising a  
Battery, neither had they prepared Fascines,  
Pickets, or any Materials, till their Prin-  
cipal arrived (and after he had pitched on a  
Place, he made a Demand of thirty thousand  
Fascines of twelve Foot long, twenty thousand  
of nine Foot long, and forty thousand Pickets,  
whereas one thousand five hundred Fascines  
built the Battery) who, *Vauan* like, would not  
begin to work, till all his Materials were on the  
Spot; and then, with five hundred Seamen, two  
or three hundred Blacks, and as many Soldiers  
as the General could spare for Pioneers, he was  
ten Days erecting a Battery; and when it was  
done, it was parallel to neither Face nor Cur-  
tain of the Fortification, and the Breach was  
made in the angular Point of the Bastion, nei-  
ther was there any safe Communication with it,  
for no Trench was ever cut, or proposed, only  
a Path through the Woods, and that almost in  
a strait Line; so that every Shot enfiladed it,  
and killed twenty times the Number of Men  
going to and from the Battery, that were killed  
every

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10 *An Account of the*  
did for near a Week ; and the Enem-  
my was contented to let them be  
pretty quiet, only now and then  
firing a Shot, until they opened a  
Bomb-Battery of four Mortars and  
some Royals on the 17th [G], and  
then the Fascine Battery on the  
*Barradera*

every where else during the Siege ; nor would  
the Engineer be prevailed on (any more than  
the General) to cut off the Communication from  
the Town to *Bocachica* (by which they might  
have prevented the Enemy from receiving any  
Succours by Land, seen all their Motions in the  
Harbour, and hindered any Incursions from the  
Castle) notwithstanding the Admiral frequently  
solicited the General and wrote to him to have  
it done.

[G] This Thing, called a Bomb-Battery, was  
also a Mark of the Genius and Understanding of  
the Engineers. It was a Platform, laid behind  
a small rising Rock, open on all Sides, no Com-  
munication to it, either by Trench, Epaulment,  
or any Security whatsoever, that the Enemy  
saw every Man (from the Castle) that went in,  
or out, as they were obliged to pass over high  
Ground, to come at the Battery, and then it lay  
quite exposed to the *Barradera* Battery ; so that  
the Shot fired from thence passed in at one End,  
and out at the other ; and if they did no Exe-  
cution

*Expedition to Cartagena. II*  
Barradera Side annoyed them greatly, and particularly the Camp, so that they were obliged to remove it several Paces off.

[H] This being represented to the Admiral, Orders were given for all

cution there, were sure to do some in the Camp. And as to the Usefulness of it, and the Service that was performed by the excellent Bombardiers, every idle Spectator was a Judge; though it was oftentimes observed, by Order, that not six Shells out of forty had done Execution, and that, on the contrary, scarce one of forty of the Enemy's ever missed.

[H] The Camp (it has been observed before) was pitched on a low Sand, but being sheltered (as a direct Object) from the *Barradera* Battery, by the Rock that St. Philip stood on, could not be seen, but lying in the Line of Direction of the Shot fired from thence, at the famous Bomb-Battery, was sure to be flanked by every Shot, which missed that, and though it might be prudent to try Movings, on this Occasion, yet it was a bad Example to the Soldiers, especially when the Chiefs moved off first, and the Thing was done without regular and publick Orders; besides the Time it took up at that Conjunction (when more material Works were in Hand, and the Army lessening every Day by Sickness, which was not to be regained.) Whereas had the

all Boats of the Squadron to be ready at Midnight (manned and armed) to go to surprize the *Barradera* Battery, and the Command given to Captain *Boscawen* [I], in which they happily succeeded, spiked up all

Encampment been formed at first, a few Yards up in the Woods, none of the Enemy's Guns could have been brought to bear on it, nor indeed would they have been able to have discovered where it was ; besides the great Advantage of Men's being cool, and particularly after working ; but, as it was placed, instead of a cool Retreat, to retire to Rest, after being heated by the warm Labour, their Tents were a hotter.

[I] The following Captains were also ordered upon this Expedition, *vix.* Capt. *Watson*, *Coates*, *Lawrence*, *Coleby*, and *Laws*, and all the Barges and Pinnaces of the Fleet. They went away from their Ships about Midnight, and rowed pretty far to Leeward, to avoid being seen, or the Noise of their Oars heard, and proposed landing in a small sandy Bay, behind the *Barradera* Battery, into which was a narrow Channel, between two Reefs of Rocks, and a four Gun Battery on the Strand, facing the Channel (both unknown to every Person there) which, so soon as some of the Boats had got into the Channel, began to fire on them ; but the brave Tars landed, and rushed in at the Embrazures, and took

## *Expedition to Cartagena. I 3*

### all the Guns ; burnt the Carriages, Platforms, and Guard-house ; de-

took Possession of the Battery, before the Enemy could fire a second Time. This firing alarmed the *Barradera* Battery, and the Enemy turned three Pieces of Canon on the Platform, which they fired with Grape Shot, so soon as the Seamen advanced ; but notwithstanding that, and the Difficulties and Badness of the Road (which was through a Morass, and where but one Man could walk abreast, and full of Stumps of Mangroves each a Foot or more high, the Seamen attacked it ; and, after a smart though short Resistance, carried it, took nine Prisoners, spiked up fifteen Guns (from eighteen to twenty four Pounders)burned the Carriages, Platforms, Guard-houses, and Magazine ; and it may with Justice be allowed (from the many Difficulties that attended this Action, in Regard to the advantageous Situation of the *Barradera* Battery, the Boats being surprised with a four Gun Battery, just as they were going to land, and no Person acquainted with the Place) as bold and surprising an Enterprise, as is to be met with ; and the Consternation it put the Enemy in seems to confirm this Opinion; for although *Bocachica* Castle, and the Enemy's four Ships, were not more than Musket Shot off, yet neither they, nor *St. Joseph's* (which was still nearer) ever fired a Shot. So that it seems as if they could not believe the Thing, though they saw all in Flames. For this gallant Action the Admiral rewarded every common Man with a Dollar apiece.

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## 14 *An Account of the*

stroyed the Magazine, and took several Prisoners [K]. The next Morning, as soon as it was Day, the Enemy from *Boccachica* began to fire warmly at the Bomb-Battery, (as if they were angry at what happened the Night before) though without doing them any particular Damage ; and as they were sensible of the Usefulness and advantageous Situation of this Battery, they set busily about repairing some Part of it, and on the 20th had built up some Embrasures and mounted two Guns, and fired them on the Bomb-Battery again, which the Admiral observing, ordered the *Rippon*, a sixty Gun ship, to go and anchor as near it, as possible, and keep fir-

[K] The Success of this Action may be said to have given the Army both Spirits and Pleasure (*pro tempore*) as it freed them from the greatest Annoyance of their Camp, and gave them an Opportunity of working quietly on their Battery.

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## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 15

ing on it to prevent the Enemy's working on it any farther [L], so that all the next Day the Army was in a State of Tranquillity, and on Sunday the 22d their grand Battery of twenty Guns being finished, about eight o'Clock in the Morning began to play very briskly on the Castle, as did the Bomb-Battery, and thirty or forty Cohorns and Royals planted on the Platform behind the

[L] Because the Enemy made such quick Dispatch in repairing some Part of the *Barradera* Battery, mounting and firing some Pieces again, the Army began to reflect, and say, the Battery was not effectually destroyed, though hundreds of Men were seen constantly at work, and Boats with Cannon, Stores, and Fasines, passing and repassing hourly, both from *Bocachica* and the Ships: But the Truth was, the Army was not accustomed to work in that brisk Manner: No! Working was no Part of their Trade. However, when the sixty Gun Ship went in against the Battery, that the Enemy was obliged to bring their Guns to fire at her, the Army cooled in their Resentments, and all was well, while the Enemy was quiet.

16 *An Account of the  
Cannon [M], which the Enemy  
returned*

[M] This grand Affair having taken up near a Fortnight in raising, and many more Men employed to work, than was necessary (for there were five hundred Seamen, between two and three hundred Blacks, besides as many Pioneers as could be spared out of the Army) much Execution may be expected therefrom: But alas! the Engineers would by no Means outdo themselves; the Battery was constructed in a Wood! and no more Ground was cleared, than a Space necessary for so stupendous a Building (left the Enemy should see the Army!) For so great Caution was used, that before the Wood in the Front of the Battery was cut down, it was a Doubt, whether any Guns could be brought to bear on the Castle; and as it was, no Guns could be brought to play on the Enemy's Shiping, although it was expected they would instantly fire on the Battery, and be capable of doing it the greatest Damage; (which they did) and had not an Epaulment been thrown up at the East End, every Shot from the Ships must have raked the Battery, and destroyed Numbers of Men. The Army allowed the Tars behaved gallantly; for it must be remarked, they had Seamen to fight the Guns in the Battery, as well as help to build it. Whether the Engineers proposed to batter the angular Point of the Bastion, or Breach is Matter of Doubt, at the first laying out of their Battery: (but infinite Reasons may be assigned for the Absurdity, besides that great

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 17

returned as briskly from the Castle, the four Ships [N] (Don Blas's in particular) St. Joseph's, and some few Guns from the Barradera, so that the Work was warm on both Sides. On the 23d the Boyne, Suffolk, Tilbury, Prince Frederick, and Hampton Court, were ordered in

great one, of having the Fire of two Flanks to destroy, instead of one) however it is generally believed, it was Hazardous; for the most impartial Judges in the Navy and Army agree, if the Enemy had cut down eighty or an hundred Paces of the Woods further round the Castle, the Undertaking would have been so difficult, as to have shocked the Science of all the Engineers, if not quite disheartened them, from so daring an Enterprize.

[N] The Position the Enemy had lain their Ships in, was beyond all Doubt the most advantageous, could be formed by Man; both for opposing any Attempt, that might be made by Shipping on the Entrance into the Harbour; or annoy any Battery, that could be raised ashore; and as they found no Battery against them, they failed not to play as briskly (as Spaniards will do when there is no body to hurt them) and did ten times more Damage than the Castle.

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18 *An Account of the*

against *Buccachica* to cannonade [O]; but the *Boyne* having anchored so far to Leeward, as to lie exposed to the whole Fire of the Enemy's Ships, and *St. Joseph's* Battery, was much shattered, and ordered off again that Night. The *Prince Frederick* and *Hampton Court*, sharing the Fire of the Enemy, that had been employed against the *Boyne*, were also much shattered by Morning, when they were likewise ordered to come off; the former having lost her Captain,

[O] These Ships were ordered to cannonade purely to oblige the General, who, because the Enemy's Ships fired at his Battery, desired the Admiral would send Ships to cannonade the Castle, though there was a Battery of twenty Guns to fire against five or six (for that was all the Castle could bring to bear on the Battery) so they had their Masts and Yards shot to pieces, and Numbers of Men killed and wounded, without doing any other Damage than beating down the Rubbish; (which the Battery would have done in half the Time, as being twice as near) for they could not come to hurt the Enemy's Ships, nor did it divert their Ships from firing at the Battery.

and

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 19

and both many Men killed and wounded. The *Suffolk* and *Tilbury* happening to anchor well to the Northward, lay battering till the next Evening (and with some Success, particularly against the Breach) when the Admiral sent Orders for them to draw off. The Army now began to look on the Breach as accessible, but the Guns in the *Barradera* Battery, being able to annoy them in their Attack, a Representation thereof was made to the Admiral, who immediately directed the *Princess Amelia*, *Litchfield*, and *Shoreham*, to go in, and anchor as nigh it as possible, and sent the Boats of the Squadron again mann'd and arm'd, under the Command of Captain *Watson* to destroy it [*P*], which they

[*P*] So soon as the Enemy saw the Boats coming to Land, and these Ships come to an Anchor close to the Battery, they deserted it, and spiked up the Guns ; but Captain *Watson*, and

they did effectually, and with scarce any Opposition; the greatest part of the Guns in *Bocachica* Castle being now dismounted, the Army thought proper to entertain the Enemy's Ships, by widening five or six Embrasures of their Battery, and playing some Guns on them, which the Ships as civilly returned, 'till Night closed in, and firing ceased on both Sides [Q]. The 25th in the Morning it was discovered, the Enemy

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and Captain *Coates* marched into it, and ripped up the Platforms, burned them and the Carriages, and effectually demolished the Battery: The Enemy fired at them from their Shipping, but without much Damage.

[Q] It may be remarked as something extraordinary, that although the Army thought the Breach just practicable, they should entirely cease firing, the Night before they intended the Attack; as it is a sort of an established Rule in all regular Sieges, to keep firing in the Night, to prevent the Enemy's removing the Rubbish, that is beat down in the Day, which the Enemy would certainly have done, if they had been sufficiently strong; for they began that Night a Counter-

## *Expedition to Carthagena.* 21

my had been throwing up some Faschine Works on the Ramparts ; however as they had not moved away any Rubbish from the Breach, it was resolved this Evening to attack it by Storm [R], and accordingly soon after Sun-set a Body of Troops marched up and mounted the

Counter-Battery of Fasclines on the Ramparts, in order to have disputed it longer, which if they had had Time to have finished, and Numbers to have carried on both Works together, (*viz.*) moving the Rubbish from the Foot of the Breach, and compleating these Counter-Batteries, they would have rendered the Attack as difficult as from the Beginning.

[R] The Army having sent in the Night to reconnoitre the Breach, and judging it surmountable, resolved this Evening to attack it, and after having made their necessary Dispositions, sent off to acquaint the Admiral with their Design, and that so soon as three Shells should be thrown in the Evening by way of Signal, the Battery should begin to fire warmly, till the Soldiers were almost at the Foot of the Breach, and then to cease, and they rush in, which had the desired Effect ; for on the Battery's playing, the Enemy retired off their Ramparts, except only one Centinel, and he hid himself behind some Fasclines ;

the Breach undiscovered, and quietly took Possession of the Castle, the Enemy flying out at the Gate so soon as they saw the Troops on the Ramparts, and heard their Huzzas. Those aboard their Ships were in the utmost Consternation at such a sudden and successful Event, and with all

Fascines; that the Troops mounted the Breach undiscovered, and were actually huzzaing on the Ramparts, and hoisting the *Englyssh Flag*, before the Enemy were apprised of them; who made the best of their Way out of their Castle Gate, excepting two, who were taken Prisoners; so that there was not a Musket fired in Opposition, nor a Gun from any of the Enemy's Ships, which is both astonishing and remarkable, as their Broadsides lay to the Castle, and the Admiral (Don Blas) was aboard. But such was the Panick they were in, that happy was he that could get first into a Boat to save himself: (and the Don did not look behind him) Each Ship was scuttled ready for sinking, and had a large square Plug in the Hole; but the *St. Philip's* People not readily getting them out, set fire to her; the *Africa* and *St. Carlos* were sunk, as it was intended the *Galicia* should also, in order to prevent any Ship's getting through the Channel, which (had the Scheme been effected) would have

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 23

all precipitate Surprise betook themselves to their Boats, setting Fire to one of their Ships, and sinking two others. At the same time the Attack was to be made on the Castle, (in order to divide the Enemy's Forces) the Admiral had given Orders

have rendered it difficult to pass, if practicable at all, without weighing some one or other of the Ships. This Victory (it will readily be allowed) gave the Army a great Share of Spirits, as it freed them from Hardships (modern Gentlemen Soldiers are not used to) and gave them Possession of an Island (as well as the Castle) in which the Enemy could not come to disturb them, especially while they had got a Fleet of Ships of War to attend on them; for, to their great Glory be it spoken, they could not venture to move along Shore without Men of War to attend on them, as they marched, and the constant Cry was, *Why don't you come to our Assistance?* Nay, so great a Liking had they to the Sea, that they could not find their Way into the Castle, after the Breach was made, without a Sea Pilot to conduct them; and what is worth Notice is, he was a Spaniard, and a Prisoner; but the General imagined, he might be as good a Pilot by Land, as by Sea, and so sent to the Admiral, to desire he might shew the Troops the Way into the Castle.

ders for the Attack of the Castle of St. *Joséph* by Boats, and sent them away under the Command of Captain *Knowles*, who took Possession of it about ten a Clock at Night, the Enemy abandoning it after firing some Guns : The Boats afterwards went and took Possession of the *Galicia*, the *Spaniſh* Admiral's Ship, and then went to Work on cutting the Boom [S], and moving the *Galicia* out of the Channel; and next

[S] The Admiral's Scheme for attacking St. *Joséph*'s had drawn all the Attention of the Enemy that Way; for so soon as they saw the Boats going to Land, their Ships began to fire pretty briskly, and St. *Joséph*'s Battery fired also; but as the Bushes prevented their seeing the Men, they did but little Harm. The Enemy sent several large Boats full of Men from their Ships into the Battery, which is pretty plain they did not expect *Buccachica* would have been attacked at that Time, or consequently they would not have sent them there. (Wherefore it is evident, this Scheme facilitated the Army's becoming Masters of *Buccachica*, and put an End to the Dispute sooner than was expected, or could

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 25

next Morning the Admiral in the *Princess Caroline*, the *Worcester*, and some other Ships sailed into the Harbour of *Cartagena*, and the whole Fleet and Transports continued to sail and warp in as fast as conveniently they could. The Enemy seeing the Admiral and several Ships got into the Harbour, began to ex-

pect

could possibly have happened, had any Nation but puissantimous *Spaniards* had the Defence of it; for had the Place been defended equal to it's Strength and excellent Disposition, both of the Ships and Batteries, it would have been a difficult Task for the Fleet and Army both to have rendered themselves Masters of it.) But so soon as they saw the Castle taken, they made the best of their Way off, in what Boats they could get, and abandoned St. *Joseph's* likewise, leaving only one drunken Man behind (who was to have blown it up) so soon as the Boats had got Possession. Captain *Coates* was left to command this Fort, and the Captains *Knowles* and *Watson* went aboard the *Galicia*, where they found the Captain of her, and about sixty Men, whom they took Prisoners, and carried aboard of the Admiral, the rest of the Crew having run away with the Boats, and prevented their escaping and sinking their Ship, as was intended.

E

pect a Visit at *Caffillo Grande* soon, and as *Mancinilla* Fort lay opposite to it within Gun-shot, and was not capable of making any great Defence, they thought proper to destroy it, lest we should take Possession of it, and so batter the Castle.

On the 28th the Admiral being informed of two small Batteries that guarded the *Passa Cavallos* [T], sent the *Weymouth* and *Cruiser* Sloop to demolish them, and take all the Imbarkations and Canoës that were there; and disposed the Fire-ships and small Frigates round the Har-

[T] *Passa Cavallos* is a Creek, that parts the grand *Baru* from the Main, through which the Supplies of Provisions that come from *Tolu* and *Sina* must pass; and here the Enemy had erected two small Batteries, one of four Guns, the other of eight, which were demolished by the *Weymouth* and *Cruiser*. The latter was sent up the Creek, to bring away five or six *Sina* Hulks (Vessels so called, as being dug out of one solid Tree, and big enough ordinarily to carry twenty Tuns) that lay there, which were very useful to the Fleet in watering.

hour,

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 27

bour, to guard every Pass and Creek, in order to cut off any Supplies going to the Town. On the 30th the Rear-Admiral and several Ships turned up the Harbour, and anchored a small Distance from *Castillo Grande*, where the Enemy made a Shew of preparing to receive them ; [V] and in order to stop the Fleet here, had sunk seven Ships across the Channel, and moored two of their Men of War, the *Conquestodore* of sixty six Guns, and the *Dragon* of

[V] Between *Castillo Grande* and *Manchinilla* Fort is a large Channel, that goes up as it were into another Harbour or large Basin ; in the Middle of the Channel is a Shoal, that divides it into two Channels ; on each Side the Shoal the Enemy had moored Ships, and sunk them ; and in the Channel next the Castle had moored two sixty Gun Ships, the *Conquestodore* and *Dragon*, and untiled their Houfes in the Castle, as if intended to defend it ; but observing the Boats sounding, and well knowing how near the Ships could lay their Broadsides against it, they certainly judged right in abandoning it, and sinking their Ships, as they must have lost many Men in defending them, and those that had happened

of sixty. The 31st early in the Morning, Captain *Knowles* observed the enemy's two Men of War sunk, and not perceiving any Men in the Castle went and acquainted Sir *Chaloner Ogle*, that it was his Opinion the Enemy had abandoned *Cassillo Grande*, who immediately ordered him to weigh Anchor, and run in with his Ship, and fire on it, which he did; and the Castle making no return, he sent his Boats ashore, and took Possession of it, and hoisted the *English* Flag: And on the Admiral's receiving Intelligence, he ordered a proper Number of Forces to garrison it [W]. The next

happened to have been left, after the Castle and Ships had been taken, must have submitted to have been Prisoners; for there was no Way of their escaping, either by Land or Water; and as their Numbers were not great, it was best collecting them in one Body, and at one Place, to make an Effort.

[W] Though this Castle was capable of making a pretty good Defence, yet the above Reasons justify

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 29

next Day Captain *Griffith*, and Captain *Rentone*, were sent to see if it was possible to get past the Enemy's Ships they had sunk, and finding the *Conguillodore's* Stern afloat, the *Burford* warped up, and cut the Stern Moorings, and hove her round, which opened a fair Channel, and the Bomb-Ketches, and two twenty Gun Ships went through. By this Time the Admiral, and greatest Part of the Squadron, were come up the Harbour. Mr. *Lefstock* and his Division was left at *Bocachica*, with Orders to reembark the Forces, and Cannon as fast as possible. The second in the Morning the Bomb-Ketches began to play on the Town, and some of the Guns of *Caffillo* justify the Enemy in abandoning it. There was in the Castle fifty seven Guns, which the Enemy had spiked up, and the Powder they had thrown into the Cistern of Water, and spoiled, but most of the Guns were got clear again, and the Castle was garrisoned with one hundred regular Troops, and about fifty Seamen.

*Grande,*

*Grande*, that were cleared, fired on a *French* Ship that lay up at the Head of the Harbour [X], upon which the Enemy set Fire to her, and she burned the greatest Part of the Day. Next Day the *Weymouth* getting through the Channel, the Town began to fire on her, but without doing any material Damage.

Great Part of the Transports with the Troops being now come up the Harbour, this Night the *Weymouth*, the three Fire-ships, and the *Cruiser* Sloop, being designed by the Admiral to cover the landing of the Forces, warped over on the other Side the Harbour undiscovered by

[X] This *French* Ship had been supplying the Enemy with Ammunition, and had not had Time to get away, before the Place was invested; and during the Siege of *Buccachica* Castle, had been used as an Hospital Ship, to receive the Enemy's wounded, and served to carry them to Town, or fetch Ammunition, or Stores, from the Castle, as Occasion required, and, to prevent her being destroyed by the *English*, the Enemy chose rather to burn her.

the

## *Expedition to Cartagena. 31*

the Enemy, who in the Morning, to shew their Resentment, gave them a Salvo of what Cannon fronted that Way; (but firing through the Bushes did no Execution) the *Cruiser Sloop* drawing but little Water, warped up a Creek, and a Party of the Enemy from a Breast-work they had thrown up, fired smartly on her with their Musketry, but were quickly dislodged, a brisk fire, chiefly with Grape Shot, having been kept all Night to scour the Woods. About 5 o'Clock next Morning, being the 5th, the Forces were landed [Y], and in their marching up from the Waterside had a small Skirmish with some of the Enemy's Troops that had

[2] All the Boats of the Fleet having been ordered to hold themselves in Readiness for landing the Forces, each respective Transport was to shew a Signal Light at Midnight, where the Boats went and received the several Regiments according as directed, and from thence went and rendezvoused aboard the *Weymouth* till dawn

had made a Lodgment in the Woods, whom they soon put to Flight; and about a Mile further were attacked a second Time, but the Enemy as soon shewed their Backs again. Finding the Country open hereabouts, the

dawn of Day; and after her scouring the Woods briskly with Grape-Shot, &c. at half an Hour past four o'Clock in the Morning they were landed at a Place called *Graita*, formerly a Country House hired by the *South-Sea* Factors, and one *Mac Pherson*, who had also been in that Company's Service, and was well acquainted with the Country, was their Guide. But, as throughout the whole, Things were done without Order or Method, so they went on still; for notwithstanding the Army had been apprised of the Enemy's having made Lodgments along the Road, yet they landed without a Grenado Shell, or a Field-Piece, and were likewise told, the Road was even and able to sustain the Weight of the heaviest Cannon. However, Providence continued to favour them better than their own Prudence could have guided, and happily they were landed with the Loss only of one Man, and two or three wounded, although some Parties of the Enemy attacked them twice: At which Time the Ships proved of great Service, as they could see every Motion the Enemy made, and fired among them very successfully: for

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 33

the Army did not chuse to make any further Advances, so they pitched

for no sooner did they attempt to make a Stand and draw up, than the Shot dispersed them, and swept off Numbers; so that if the Army had vouchsafed to have pushed their Success, it is a general received Opinion (even amongst themselves now) they might have rendered themselves Masters of the Castle of *St. Lazare* that Day (even without Field-Pieces) for the whole Force of the Town was out against them (as they were told by some Prisoners they took and some Deserters) and very impolitically divided into several Bodies; and in the Panick they were in, and each Party running different Ways, it would have been no difficult Task, to have rendered themselves Masters of that small Rendered, if not succeeded in forcing the City Gates; for what had they to do, but to follow the Enemy close at their Heels, and slaugther them? Before they had got into the Town, the other must; for when they were mixed in a Body amongst their Enemy, the Town dared not venture to have fired, for fear of killing their own People; but instead of making Use of any of these Advantages, they contented themselves in taking Possession of the Ground the Enemy had left them Masters of, and there posted their Advanced Guards, and retired with the main Body behind *La Paga* to encamp; and here almost as many Days were spent in forming an Encampment, as at *Bocachica*.

on

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### 34 *An Account of the*

on a Place for encamping, and the Evening sent a Party up to *La Pappa* to take Possession of that, if the Enemy had abandoned it [Z.] In the mean while all possible Dispatch was made in landing the Baggage, Provision, Cannon, Ammunition, &c. [A] which the Enemy surprisingly suffered, notwithstanding the landing Place was within reach of the Guns of *St. Lazare*; yet they fired but seldom, for it appeared afterwards their Attention was more

[Z] *La Pappa* is a Convent, which stands on the Top of the highest Hill, near *Cartagena*, and was a most advantageous Part for observing the Enemy's Motions, as it overooked the Town and Country for many Leagues round about.

[A] Though it might have been expected from the Loss and Destruction of Ordnance Stores at *Boccaccina*, more Care would have been taken here, yet, instead of that, the worthy Officer of the Train doubled his Neglect, and Things were in much more Disorder and Confusion than they were there, notwithstanding here was Choice of Ground to pitch upon for an

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 35

more towards their own Safety, (or 'tis certain they might have done a great deal of Mischief;) for whilst the Army were employed, and getting their things ashore, the Enemy were as busy in making a Fafcine Battery of four Pieces of Cannon on the Brow of the Hill, and carrying on a Trench (or Line) round the Foot of the Castle, which they completed in a very short Time [B], quicker than the Army could make a Battery

an Artillery Park; but it was too much Trouble and Labour to move the Stores from the Place where they were first put down in, at landing, and required more Attendance than could be spared from the Bottle (and it is a well known Proverb, *When the Shepherd's away, the Flock will stray,*) so that out of two or three hundred Men, that were appointed to attend this Service, it was well if thirty were found at Work.

[B] When the Army landed, there were scarce any Works worth Notice round the Castle of St. Lazare, but a Fafcine Battery of five Guns on the North Side of the Hill (which was built the Year before, when Admiral Vernon bombarded the Town) and was of no Service, bat

## 36 *An Account of the*

a Battery only for three Mortars, and throw up a small Breast-work for their Advance-Guards. But no Care was yet taken to cut off the Communication between Town and Country [C]. Complaints now began to be made; that the Number of

in Case of Approaches being made that Way: But as the Enemy saw the Army (disposed to Rest rather than Work) go on slowly, they took Occasion to improve their Time, and with unwearyed Diligence set to Work, and in three Days Time completed a four Gun Battery, and entrenched themselves in Lines round about the Foot of the Castle, which were stronger, and of much more Importance, than the Castle itself, and drew those Guns off the Faschine Battery on the North Port, and mounted them in this new Battery, and saluted the Army frequently with them, whilst they were working on their Bomb-Battery and Lodgment for their Advanced Guards.

[C] It has been remarked, that neither General nor Engineer could be prevailed on to cut off the Communication, notwithstanding the Admiral represented the Necessity thereof, as the most sure Means to distress the Enemy, and had sent the *Dunkirk* to anchor off the *Bogilla*, to prevent any Embarkation bringing Supplies by Water,

*Expedition to Cartagena.* 37  
of Sick was greatly increased in the Camp ; upon which the Admiral immediately supplied them with a Detachment of Lord James Caven-dish and Colonel Bland's Regiments, that

ter, as he had done the Falmouth at the grand Barr, on the Outside of *Passa Cavallos* (before the taking of *Bocaclica*) which effectually prevented any Refreshments coming to the Enemy from *Tolu*, and the River *Sina*, their Principal Markets ; yet nothing was of Weight enough for its being done here, although so very easy, and the Army were complaining heavily, for want of Refreshments, and yet suffered Supplies daily to go into the Town. The *Boguilla* is the Mouth of the Lake (behind *Cartagena*) that opens into the Sea, where the Enemy kept a Guard of about an hundred Men, and was the only Way possibly they had left for Supplies to come to them ; and though fresh Provisions were scarce in the Camp, and would have been exceedingly beneficial to the Sick, yet so little Pains did the Army care to take to get it, that when the General was acquainted, that a Drove of three or four hundred Head of Oxen were going along the Strand, he did not dispatch a Party to intercept them, or endeavour to cut them off, not in three Hours after he had been informed of the Thing, and then the Cattle were going into the Town. But so far were the Army from being disposed

## 38 *An Account of the*

that had remained aboard the Ships  
as part of their Compliments, and  
a Body of such *Americans* as were  
fit for Duty [D].

Upon

disposed to cut off the Communication on that Side, that they were continually forming Ideas of the Enemy's coming that Way to attack them, and that they were actually raising Batteries on some of the Islands in the Lake, to drive them out of the Camp, and could not be convinced to the contrary, till the Admiral ordered a large Canoe to be carried over Land, and launched into the Lake, which was manned and armed, and an Officer of the *Weymouth* and a Land Officer sent in her round the Lake, to reconnoitre; upon whose Return, those dreadful Apprehensions were dissipated.

[D] From the first Sight of the *American* Troops they were despised, and as many of them were *Jiffs*, (*suspected Papists*) were never employed till now; but as Sicknes encreased amongst the others (and hourly Attacks expected from the Enemy) it was thought expedient to have them ashore; and though it is most certain, there was scarce one but knew what Opinion had been conceived of them, nay indeed told them, that had not the Fellows been better than they were taken for, it was enough to have exasperated them to have deserted. The other Soldiers of Lord *James Cavendish* and Col. *Bland's* Regiments were as good Troops as any on the Expedition; and

## *Expedition to Cartagena.* 39

Upon this Reinforcement, and the Apprehensions of the rainy Seasons, which were daily expected, on the eighth in the Afternoon a Land Council of War was held [E], wherein it was resolved to attack the Castle and Trenches of *St. Lazare*,

and after this Reinforcement, it was expected the Communication would have been immediately cut off ; (as it had been suggested Numbers could not be spared before) but so far from that, that the Army still complained, that they had not Men enough to relieve their Guards ; and indeed, according to the Number they mounted, *Marsborough's* Army would scarce have been sufficient ; for the Advance Guard consisted of five hundred Men, the Picket eight hundred, besides several other Out-Guards of one hundred, and some fifty ; whereas the Enemy had but one Guard (that faced this Way) without their Work, and that of seven Men only. Thus were the poor Wretches harassed.

[E] When the Council of War met, several of the general Officers and Colonels dissented from this Resolution, as judging it too rash an Undertaking, without a proper Breach being made first, or at least before the Place had been well reconnoitred ; but in order to solve this last Difficulty, there were several Deserters that offered to go as Guides, and three of the most intelligent were pitched upon,

(without

(without first raising a Battery to make a Breach) and to this Resolution the Engineer joined in Opinion [F]. Accordingly on the ninth in the Morning between three and four o'Clock the Attack was made, and maintained very resolutely on both Sides till between six and seven, when the Enemy obliged the Forces to retreat after a considerable Loss of Officers and Men [G] After the Miscarriage of this Scheme (which

[F] The principal Engineer being killed at *Boccaccia*, his Successor (being none of the most knowing in the Science) did not chuse any Works should be taken in Hand, as they would expose his Ignorance ; so chearfully gave into that Opinion.

[G] After the Majority of the Council of War had determined on the Attack, a proper Time was now the Question, as to which the Deserters informed them, about two o'Clock in the Morning would be the best Time ; for the Guards from the Town that nightly patroled round the Foot of the Hill would by that Time be returned and gone to their respective Homes ; because as Duty went hard (their Numbers being but small)

## *Expedition to Cartagena. 41*

(which was the occasion of the Town's not being taken) the Army sickened surprisingly fast, and those that were killed being esteemed the Flower of the

small) it was customary for them, as soon as they had performed their Rout, to go to Bed; and further observed, that when a *Spaniard* has laid himself down to sleep, it is no easy Task to raise him to fight; but these Arguments were of no Force to the General; just before Day was his Time; accordingly, about four o'Clock in the Morning the Attack began, and a Party of Grenadiers, along with Colonel *Grant*, entered the Trenches at the Foot of the Castle, but not being sustained, were cut off, and Colonel *Grant* shot through the Body. After this, instead of rushing in, Sword in Hand, and mingling with the Enemy in the Trenches, a full Stop was made, and the Men stood firing in Platoons; those that had Room, and could wheel off for others, did, but the greatest Part stood and fired all their Ammunition away, while the Enemy (as it was now Day-light, and they could take Aim) were mowing them down, like Gras, with their Cannon, Musketry, and Grenadoes; notwithstanding which, the Troops faced them like Lions, and wanted but to have been led on, or told what they were to have done, and they certainly would have taken the Place. But, instead of that, from the most excellent Disposition that was made, no Officer attempted

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O A W O M

attempted to lead them on, and the Grenado Shells, that should have been in the Front, and distributed among the Soldiers, were in Boxes in the Rear ; nor was there one Length of lighted Match among them. The Woolpacks and Scaling Ladders were also in the Rear. But when Colonel Grant entered the Trenches, such Call was made for them, that some few were carried up the Hill ; however as he, poor Gentleman, fell, no body else tried to make Use of them ; and so amongst other Things they were left for the Enemy. As this Scheme was but badly formed from the Beginning, (and indeed may be properly called the General's own Scheme) so it as unfortunately ended ; for the Admiral not being acquainted with this Resolution of the Council of War, (either by Letter or Message) had not an Opportunity of acting in Conjunction with them, and affixing them with a Body of Seamen, as it is evident he would have done ; for as soon as he was acquainted the Fort was attacked, and got up and saw the Troops at a Stand, the Instant a Signal could be seen, (at Dawn of Day) he made one for all the Boats in the Fleet manned and armed, and sent them with Orders to follow the General's Directions ; but it was too late ; before they got ashore, the Troops were returned from the Attack.

*Expedition to Cartagena.* 43  
defend himself, much more to carry  
on a Siege against the Place, and  
hoped, if the Admiral (who had  
ordered the *Weymouth* to erect a

Various are the Accounts of the Losses sustained in this Action ; but it is generally believed, there were upwards of one hundred Men killed, and near two hundred wounded, thirty of whom were taken Prisoners, Numbers of Arms, Colours, Drums, Woolpacks, Grenadoes, Pick-axes, Shovels, Scaling Ladders, &c. were left behind in the Retreat, which the Enemy arrogantly diverted themselves withal, for some Time, on the Top of the Hill, taking Care to let the Army see them.

As when Faults are committed, the first Thing sought after is an Excuse ; so, not succeeding in this Attack, the Army now fell to blaming the Guides, saying, they had led them the wrong Way ; the Guides again say, the Army would not follow them the Way they would have led them ; but had Reason alone been their Guide, sure they should have attacked the Castle on the weakest Side ; (for they all knew one Side was defenceless) whereas they attacked it on the strongest Side, where the Hill was most difficult of Access ; and when they found themselves repulsed, and at a Loss what to do, the speedier they had made their Retreat, the smaller had been their Loss.

G 2 Bomb.

44 *An Account of the  
Bomb-Battery, which was finished  
and played in two Days) expected  
any Thing to be done, he would  
order some Ships in to cannonade  
the Town [H], otherwise desired  
these Things might be considered in  
a general Council of War, of Sea and  
Land*

[H] The Admiral had sent several Officers in to sound, and try if Ships might come near enough to batter, who all gave it, as their Opinions, that there could not more than three Ships possibly anchor at the upper End of the Harbour ; and if they were laid but in a Foot Water more than they drew, they would not be in a Point-Blank-Shot, and consequently could do no material Execution ; however, to convince the General, that Ships could be of no manner of Service to him, the Admiral caused the *Galicia* (one of the *Spaniſh* Ships) to be fitted proper for battering, by forming, between each Port, Mergions (or Cafes) of six Foot thick, and filled with rammed Earth or Sand, and sent her in to cannonade the Town ; but it was soon found, she could not come near enough to do any Service ; for the enemy had demolished her so, in two or three Hours, that she would have sunk in half an Hour more, if she had not been drawn off ; and it may be established as a general Rule, for Ships to go by, that unless they can come within half a Musket

## *Exedition to Cartagena.* 45

Land Officers, and accordingly on the 15th a Council of War was held, who came to a Resolution (upon the General's Representation of the bad State of the Army) [I], to have the Cannon and Forces reembarked with all convenient Speed, and the 17th in the Night the Troops were accordingly [K] taken off the Shore.

Nothing

a Musket or Pistol Shot of a Fortification, it will have the Advantage of them, for the further you lye off, the more Guns they can bring to bear against you ; whereas, when you go so near, there can no more Guns annoy you, than are mounted within the Length of your Ship ; and the Difference of Briskness in firing, betwixt a Ship and a Fort, is so great, besides the Odds in Number of Guns, that it is impossible to withstand a Ship long. After this Experiment the *Galicia* was burned.

[I] After the famous Battle of St. Lazar, the Troops sickened very fast, insomuch, that by Account delivered in (and the General's Report) between *Thursday* Morning and *Friday* Night, they had dwindled away from 6645 to 3200, and 1200 of these were *Americans*, and not esteemed fit for Service.

[K] When the Council of War agreed to the Forces being embarked, the General urged, that they

Nothing remained now but to get the Fleet and Transports ready for Sea, and to demolish the Castles and Fortifications already taken, which last was effectually done by blowing them up, and by the 12th of May the whole Fleet and Forces had taken leave of *Carthagena*.

they might come off in the Night, left the Enemy should make a Sortie, so that the Boats were ordered ashore about nine o'Clock, and from the Apprehensions they were in of the Enemy's being at their Heels, many of them left their Baggage, and Numbers of them their Tents and Arms, which the Enemy came the next Morning and picked up. The Tents they pitched upon St. Lazare Hill, and other Places, where they might best be seen, and by a Flag of Truce that had Occasion to pass the next Day, about Exchange of Prisoners, they failed not to express their Astonishment at the precipitate Retreat of the Army. Thus ended this famous Expedition, that was the greatest and most expensive that ever entered the *American Seas*, and which Europe gazed on with Admiration and Attention.

## A P P E N D I X.

In order more fully and clearly to form a Judgment of the foregoing Expedition, it may not be improper to subjoin this Narrative of the Enemy's Situation, Strength, and Disposition at *Cartagena*, as the Fleet and Forces found them on their Arrival there: And in order to carry it on agreeable to the Advances that were made, begin with a *Disposition* of *Punta Canoa Bay*, where the Fleet first anchored. This Bay is about five Miles to the North West of the City of *Cartagena*, but not an extraordinary good anchoring Place, as the Water is shoal a great Way off the Shore, and the Coast pretty strait, that Ships are not much sheltered with the Point of Land, from the Violence of the Breezes that generally blow. In the Bottom of this Bay is an Entrance into the great Lake of *Jesea*, (called the *Boquilla*) where the Enemy had a small Faiscine

Fascine Battery of four Pieces of Cannon, and kept a Guard; but upon the Fleet's Arrival, (and during the Time they continued to lie there) a considerable Number of the Enemy's Forces, both Horse and Foot, kept constantly there, expecting a Descent. The next Place of Note was the *Cruizes*, where the Enemy kept a Guard ordinarily of a hundred Men: This Place is about half Way from the *Boquilla* to the Town, and guards a narrow Creek or Pass from the Town to the Lake, called *Pesca de Yuan D'Ingoa*, through which Supplies come in Canoës from the other Side of the Lake to the Town: As for the City itself, Nature has fortified that against any Attempt by Sea, the Water shoaling near a League off, and the Shore being plentifully bounded with Rocks; besides, the Sea is very seldom smooth, so that it is difficult at all Times landing. However, as the Enemy knew the Bravery of those they had to deal with, they began to wall this Side of the Town, and make a Ravelin in the Middle, there being already a strong Bastion at each End. *Bocca Grande* being the next Place the Enemy suspected an Attempt might be designed, had posted two of their Men of War, the *Conquebodore* of sixty six Guns, and the *Dragon* of sixty to guard it, and began two Fascine Batteries, one

## APPENDIX. 49

one on each Point of the Entrance. This Passage, called *Bocca Grande*, was formerly the principal Entrance into the Harbour, but by Storms, and the Force of the Sea, a Bank was thrown up, which quite closed the Entrance, and then it was called *Bocca Serrada*; but as strange Revolutions are frequent in these Countries, within these few Years this Passage has broke out again, and there is now nine or ten Foot Water in it. About three Miles below this, on the Island of *Terra Bomba*, was a small Fort of four Guns, called *Battery de Chamba*; and half a Mile further, a Faschine Battery of twelve Guns, (both of these the Enemy had abandoned.) The next Places of Defence were the Forts of *St. Philip* and *St. Jago*, one of seven Guns, the other of fifteen, which served as Redoubts to the Castle of *Bocachica*. One of these Forts was built on the Rock *Ponti* landed on, and probably to prevent any one's landing there again, (especially so easily as he did.) The Castle of *Bocachica* was the Enemy's chief Dependence, as it guarded the Entrance into the Harbour. It is a regular Square, with four Bastions well built, and was capable of making a stout Defence if well garrisoned, and would have been much stronger had the Glacis and Countercarp been finished. There was

## 50 APPENDIX.

was mounted in it eighty two Guns, and three Mortars, and the Enemy had cleared three or four hundred Yards of the Woods round it, to prevent Approaches being made undiscovered, (as *Ponti* did in 1697.) On the other Side the Harbour's Mouth was a Fuscine Battery of fifteen Guns, called the *Barradera*; and in a small Bay a back of that, another Battery of four Guns; and facing the Entrance of the Harbour, on a small flat Island, stood *St. Jóseph's* Fort of twenty one Guns: From this Fort to *Bocachica Castle* a Boom and Cables were fixed across, fastned with three large Anchors at each End; and just within the Boom was moored in a Line four Men of War, the *Galicia* of sixty six Guns, (aboard which was the Admiral Don *Blas D'León*,) the *Africa* and *St. Carlos*, each of sixty six Guns, and the *St. Philip* of seventy Guns, which spread the Width of the Harbour's Mouth, that there was not room for a Ship either to pass a head or a stern of them, so that it was impossible for shipping to force an Entrance into the Harbour; and had the Enemy here made a Defence equal to the admirable Disposition they had formed, it must have been a difficult Task for the Fleet to have got in, even after *Bocachica Castle* was taken. *So About four or five Miles from hence* is a

## APPENDIX. 51

is a Creek, or Passage, that parts the Grand Barn from the Main called *Pajfa Carvallos*, through which there is Water enough for small Vessels : This Pafs the Enemy had defended with two Fasinc Batteries, one of eight Guns, the other of four, as well to protect their own Imbarkations that come this Way with Provisions from *Tolu*, and the River *Sina*, as to prevent any Attempts being made this Way. The next place of Defence was *Castillo Grande*, which is about eight Miles up the Harbour. This Castle is a regular Square with four Bastions, strong and well built, and defended to the Land by a wet Ditch and Glacis proper, and one Face towards the Sea has a Raveline, and a double Line of Guns. This Castle can mount sixty one Guns, though there was but fifty seven in it. Opposite to this was a Horse-shoe Battery of twelve Guns, called *Mancinilla*; and in the Middle between these two Forts is a large Shoal with not above two or three Foot Water on it, which divides the Channel into two : In each of these Passages were Ships sunk across, to prevent, if possible, the Fleet's getting by; for that Part of the Harbour above these Castles is a perfect Basin, and seems rather like one Harbour within another, so that if some of the Ships could not have got past to have covered

## 52 APPENDIX.

vered the Troops landing (where they did) they must have marched several Miles, and been greatly exposed ; besides, it would have been excessively difficult transporting the Cannon, neither could the Bomb-Ketches have got near enough this Way to have diverted the Town ; so that the Intent of this Disposition was exceeding good, had it been effectually executed, (but Fear made the Enemy work in too much Hurry.) Near three Miles further up the Harbour, on two flat Sandy Islands, or Keys, stands the famous City of *Carthagena*, and *Himani*, called its Suburbs, which are both irregular Figures, but well fortified to the Land with strong Bastions at proper Distances, and Lakes and Morasses running round them ; and the Water at the Head of the Harbour shoal so far off, that Ships cannot come near enough to do any material Execution with their Guns, which adds much to it's Strength.

About a Quarter of a Mile from the Gate of *Himani*, on a pretty high Eminence, stands the Castle (or Redoubt) of *St. Lazare*, which in itself is but trifling, but it's Situation very advantageous, and by some new Works lately thrown up much strengthened. This Redoubt overlooks all the Town,

but

## APPENDIX. 53

but has a Brow of a Hill (about four hundred Yards from it) that overlooks it as much, and entirely commands it, where would have been a proper Place to have raised a Battery, which the Enemy full well knew, for they constantly kept a Guard there, to observe the Army's Motions. As it was this famous Castle put an End to the Siege of *Carthagena*, a particular Description of it may not be unwelcome.

The Hill it stands on is about fifty or sixty Foot high, naturally steep, but made more so by the Earth out of the Trenches and Lines being thrown over the Brow. The Castle is a Square of about fifty Foot, with three Demi-Bastions, two Guns in each Face, one in each Flank, and three in each Curtain. When the Army first landed, there was no material Works about the Castle, but a Faschine Battery, of five Guns at the North End of the Hill, facing the Brow of the commanding Hill abovementioned; but whilst they were encamping, &c. the Enemy cut Lines round the Foot of the Castle, and erected another Faschine-Battery on the South Brow of the Hill, and brought four Guns out of the North Battery, and mounted in this, as it commanded the Ascent of the Hill best; these Lines ran in Traverses, and commu-

## 54 APPENDIX.

communicated from Battery to Battery, and were a better Defence, and much stronger, than all the other Works together. After the Attack, the Enemy being able to judge where their Foible lay, mounted two Guns in the Lines, against the angular Point of one of the Bastions (which was not defended) where the Troops ascended the Hill, and to the South Part of the Hill lengthened their Lines, and made a Stair-case up the Hill, to the Faschine-Battery, and a Breast-work cross the Road, from the Foot of the Hill down to the Water-side, which effectually blocked themselves up, and was a Security against the Army's making a second Attack, and coming at them the right Way, as they might have done at first, had they taken the Guide's Advice. The Side next the Town is quite defenceless, and the Way into the Castle up a Ladder, on that Side, which draws up, like a Bridge. •

From the several Examinations of Deserters it appeared, the Number of the Enemy did not exceed four thousand, (regular Forces, Seamen, Militia, Blacks, and Indians included) and daily Experience convinced us of the Goodness of their Engineers, Bombardiers, and Gunners, as Deserion and Cowardice convinced us of the Badness of others.

Having

## APPENDIX.

55

Having given an Account of the Enemy's Situation and Strength, it may likewise be necessary to relate some Account of the State of the Army, and what pretty Instruments and Materials they were furnished withal. That the whole Body of the Troops, that came from *England* (unless two Regiments) were raw, new raised, undisciplined Men, is a Fact known to every one; and the greatest Part of the Officers commanding them, either young Gentlemen whose Quality or Interest entitled them to Preferment, or abandoned Wretches of the Town, whose Prostitution had made them useful on some dirty Occasion, and by Way of Reward were provided for in the Army; but both these Sorts of Gentlemen had never seen any Services, consequently, knew not properly how to act, or command; so that the worthy old experienced Officers, who had served long and well, underwent a continual Hardship, in teaching and disciplining a young raw Army, at a Time when they were on Service, and every one ought to have been Masters of their Trade, instead of having it to learn; and thus, by more frequently exposing themselves, most of them were knocked on the Head. As for the *American* Troops, they were in general many Degrees

## 56 APPENDIX.

Degrees worse, but the Officers in particular, who were composed of Blacksmiths, Taylors, Shoemakers, and all the Banditti that Country affords, in somuch, that the other Parts of the Army held them in scorn. And for Engineers, Bombardiers, and Gunners, worse never bore the Name, or could be picked out of all Europe.

Amongst the ten Engineers, there was but one who ever saw a Siege (and that was the simple Siege of *Gibraltar*) and he was killed at *Boccahica*, in the midst of his own defenceless Works; so that therest may justly have been said to be left without a Head. As for the Bombardiers and Gunners, the Colonel commanding the Train was in his grand Climacterick, and consequently very unfit to be sent upon this Expedition; but he, poor Gentleman, was soon dispatched (thanks to the Ignornace of the Engineers) and his Successor took care to render himself as unfit for Duty, by Excess of Drinking, as Old Age rendered the other; and as to Inferiors of both Sorts, Bombardiers and Cannoneers, many of them were Country Fellows, who told the General they were provided for in the Train for voting for Mr.— and Mr. such a one, &c. Out of these few that were good, by constant Attendance

## APPENDIX. 57

tendance and Duty's falling hard few were left, and indeed they had not many Opportunities of shewing their Abilities, the Materials they were provided withal being mostly bad; for two thirds of the Bomb-Shells either broke short in the Air, or their Fuses went out, and they never broke at all; nor were there one in three of the Grenadoes would burst; the Shells were so thick, and the Cavity so small, they would not hold Powder sufficient to crack them; nay, so little Care was taken in providing and packing up proper Materials for a Train of Artillery, that out of eight Pieces of Battering-Cannon-Principals, one was found defective and unserviceable, and the Expedition had like to have set forward, without a Plank or Joist for Platforms for the Guns, or any Bill-Hooks to cut Fasernes and clear the Ground, had not Lord *Catcart* been informed these Things were wanting, and wrote timely to have them supplied before the Fleet sailed, which lay then at *St. Helens*.

Upon the whole, the Service that has been performed best demonstrates the Goodness of this Army: How much it has suffered, as well as the Reputation of the Nation,

## 58 APPENDIX.

tion, by the Death of Lord Cathcart, the End of the Expedition must resolve.

Thus much may be said in Behalf of the common Soldiers, though they were raw and undisciplined, they wanted not for Courage and Resolution becoming Englishmen.

## F I N I S.



2 JY 61

